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pending on the endowment of capital asset among firms. We show that the
merger makes the collusion easier to sustain when asymmetric capital stock
combines with less efficient insiders because of more symmetric conditions
and closer incentive constraints. Moreover, this model allows us to determine
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I. Introduction
Merger control is a preventive authorization system with the major goal to
prevent mergers which diminish competitiveness. The antitrust authority
analyses if a merger can make it more likely or more effective for firms to
coordinate their actions (coordinated effects) and if it can make it profitable
for the merging firms to reduce output and raise price unilaterally (unilateral
effects) 1.
The impact of a merger on the possibility to collude ex post is studied
by several authors2 who show that if the asymmetry between firms is in-
creased after a merger, then the risk of coordinated actions decreases. When
firms become very asymmetric, then it is more difficult to provide the right
incentives to small firms not to deviate from the collusive path.
From the merger control point of view, our model reinforces these results
and completes the existing literature to determine a threshold of asymmetry
necessary for a merger to have pro-competitive effects.
Another strand of literature related to this paper deals with leniency
programs (as Motta-Polo, 2003). These programs reduce fines for cartel
members who report themselves to and assist the antitrust authority, and
the impact of leniency programs can be seen in the recent increase in success-
ful cartel investigations. For example, in the period from 14 February 2002
until the end of 2005, the European Commission received 167 applications
under the 2002 Leniency Notice. Of these applications, 87 were requests
for immunity and 80 were requests for reduction in fines. The Commission
has granted 51 decisions for conditional immunity. Over the same period,
1Council Regulation (EC) no 139/2004
2Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002), McAfee and Williams (1992), Vasconcelos (2005)
2
the Commission rejected or decided not to deal any further with 23 applica-
tions and had under scrutiny 13 more recent applications.3. The presence of
leniency programs introduces a coordination game between the cartel mem-
bers (apply for leniency or not?). Motta and Polo (2003) show that leniency
programs have two possible effects. The first is the deviation from the car-
tel agreement by firms which report information to the antitrust authority.
The second (being a negative effect) is the attenuation of the expected cost
of anticompetitive behavior because of reduced fines. One key mechanism
in their model is the possibility for firms to apply for leniency even if the
investigation is opened.
Our model combines two streams of the literature. Firstly, from the point
of view of merger control (ex ante system), we study the impact of a merger
on collusion and estimate a threshold of asymmetry between firms. Secondly,
we take into account leniency programs to detect and punish collusive agree-
ments (ex post system). Taking these two streams into account allows us to
develop a global model and to obtain clear policy implications.
Our principal results are as follows.
We show that when the endowment of capital asset is symmetric initially,
then collusion is less feasible after the merger takes place. Indeed, the merger
leads asymmetry among firms, and this determines different incentives to col-
lude. Harder conditions for collusion arise for the same argument also when
firms’ capital stocks are asymmetric pre-merger and the insiders are more
efficient. Ex post, the outsiders are smaller and weaker, which make their in-
centives harder to meet. But when asymmetric capital stock combines with
less efficient insiders, then the merger makes the collusion easier to sustain
3European Commission, MEMO/06/357.
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because of more symmetric conditions and closer incentive constraints. This
model allows us to determine an optimal threshold of asymmetry among
insiders and outsiders such as a merger has pro-competitive effects. This
threshold only depends on the number of active firms in the industry and
on the amount of fine but does not depend on the discount factor. Finally,
we compare this value with the value which would restore perfect symmetry
between firms after the merger takes place.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
model. Characterizations of equilibria are provided in section 3. In sections
4 and 5, we deal with the impact of a merger on collusion. Concluding
remarks follow in section 6. Proofs of results appear in the appendix.
II. The model
We consider a simple framework consisting of a Cournot homogeneous prod-
uct industry, with n firms, n ≥ 44. Demand is linear, with price p = 1−Q,
where Q denotes the total quantity produced in the industry. Following
Perry and Porter (1985), cost is assumed to be dependant on the capital
owned by the firms :
C(qi, ki) = cqi +
q2i
2ki
,∀i ∈ [1, n]
with 0 ≤ c < 1 and qi denotes the quantity chosen by firm i. Each firm has
a share of a specific asset that affects marginal costs, which is its produc-
tion capacity, denoted by ki. The total supply of capital in the industry is
assumed to be fixed, which is normalized to one:
∑n
i=1 ki = 1,∀i = 1...n.
We assume an upward-sloping linear marginal cost function, where the
4The minimal number of firms (n = 4) is made clear in the appendix A.
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slope is a decreasing function of the firms’ share of the industry’s stock of
capital :
∂C(qi, ki)
∂qi
= c+
qi
ki
> 0 ;
∂2C(qi, ki)
∂q2i
> 0 ;
∂2C(qi, ki)
∂qi∂ki
< 0
In this context, a firm is more efficiency if it is “large” (if it owns a large
fraction of the capital stock).
In a first part, we suppose that firms are ex ante symmetric : ki =
kj ,∀i, j ∈ [1, n]. In a second part, we loosen this assumption by considering
two groups of firms with different production capacities. More precisely,
two identical firms (firms which are supposed to merge) are to have the
same production capacity, denoted by k1 = k2, which is different from the
production capacity of the other firms (the outsiders), denoted by: kj (∀j 6=
1, 2).
We consider a merger between the two firms 1 and 2 and we study its
impact on the risk of collusion. The outcome of the execution of a collusive
agreement is assumed to be that the colluding firms will thence reduce output
below the competitive level. We suppose that the antitrust authorities use
leniency programs; these programs provide the incentive of reduced fines to
firms which reveal information about collusion to the antitrust authorities.
Motta-Polo (2003) design four parameters for the enforcement policy:
• F ∈ [0, F¯ ] : the value of the fine if firms are detected by the antitrust
authority and have not cooperated with it, F¯ being the maximum
possible fine which can be imposed.
• f ∈ [0, F ] : the value of the reduced fine for the firm which denounces
the collusive agreement. It is assumed that all firms which cooperate
with the antitrust authority will be granted the same reduced fines.
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It is also assumed that the reduction is high enough in order for the
leniency program to be really effective (if f is close to the full fine (F ),
firms will not have incentive to reveal information).
• α ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that firms are reviewed by the antitrust
authority.
• s ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that the antitrust authority successfully
concludes the investigation when firms do not cooperate.
These parameters are assumed to be exogenous.
Type I errors (firms not colluding are still prosecuted) are assumed not
to happen whereas Type II errors (colluding firms not fined) are assumed to
happen.
The timing of the game is as follows (with n or n − 1 active firms): At
t = 1, firms decide to reach a collusive agreement or to deviate (playing non
cooperatively). The collusion strategy is modelled on the basis of a trigger
strategy: once a firm deviates from the collusive agreement, all the firms will
play non cooperatively until the end of the game5.
If no firm deviates until a time t then they collude again and get a profit
piM . We study the case in which firms can sustain the joint profit maximiza-
tion, so the subscript M indicates a collusive outcome since collusion aims
at monopolizing the industry. If, at time t, the antitrust authority decides
to open an investigation then there are two assumed outcomes :
• Cooperation: firms denounce the cartel to the antitrust authority; they
pay the reduced fine f , play non cooperatively during one period and
5These strategies have been initially suggested by Friedman (1971)
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restart collusion after an inquiry is concluded. If however a firm devi-
ates from the collusive agreement, firms play non cooperatively until
the end of the game.
• No cooperation: at t + 1 (firms do not cooperate with the antitrust
authority so one other period is needed to conclude the investigation),
if firms are not condemned with probability (1− s) then they continue
to play cooperatively; if they are found guilty, then they pay the total
fine F and have to play non cooperatively during one period. As in
the cooperation case, in one firm deviates from the collusive agreement,
firms play non cooperatively until the end of the game.
Consequently, in this game, there are two types of deviation : the devia-
tion from the collusive agreement and the reporting to the antitrust author-
ity.
The equilibria of the game can now be analysed.
III. Equilibria
This section describes all the various types of equilibria. We describe the per-
fect Nash equilibria of the game and we have to resolve this game considering
merger or not in the first period (game with n or n− 1 active firms).
Firstly, we consider the case of symmetric firms. In this context, Motta
and Polo (2003) suggest that there are three types of equilibria: no collusion
(NC), collusion and revelation (CR) and collusion and no revelation (CNR).
The existence of these equilibria depends on the value of the relevant pa-
rameters. CR equilibrium exists if the profit of firm colluding and revealing
to the antitrust authority is greater than the profit of a firm which deviates.
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CNR equilibrium exists if firm which colludes and does not reveal informa-
tion has no incentive to reveal information to the antitrust authority and
also to deviate from the collusive agreement.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the common discount factor.
The results obtained by Motta-Polo (2003) are as follows:
lemma 1. (Motta-Polo (2003) for low values of f)6
• for s ∈ [0, sCNR[ and α < αNC(s) : CNR and CR exist and CNR is
Pareto dominant.
• for s ∈ [sCNR, 1] and α ∈ [0, αCR[ : CNR and CR exist and CR is
Pareto dominant.
• in other cases: only NC equilibrium exists.
with:

sCNR=
(1+δ)(piM−piN+f)
δ(piM−piN+F )
αCR =
piM−(1−δ)piD−δpiN
(piM−piN+f)
αNC =
(1+δ)(piM−(1−δ)piD−δpiN )
δs(piM−piN+F )
The following graphic represents the Subgame Perfect Equilibria.7
6Motta and Polo (2003) consider three low values for the reduced fine. We study the
case in which the leniency program is the most effective, consequently: f < δ(piD − piN )
7When several equilibria can exist, we keep only the Pareto dominant
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Figure 1: Subgame Perfect Equilibria
The region labelled 1 represents the area where firms make collusive
agreements under leniency programs whereas they would not collude in the
absence of any leniency program. Region 2 represents the area where the
parameters are such as to make ex post desistence easier by encouraging
revelation and by shortening investigations time.
In order for αCR to be strictly positive, it is necessary that δ must be
higher than δ˜ = piD−piMpiD−piN . δ˜ is the usual critical discount factor when firms
collude with no threat of prosecution. The case αCR < 0 means that firms
9
never make any collusive agreement.
IV. The impact of a merger on collusion
The two firms which propose to merge are identical (k1 = k2). The others
have another same production capacity : ki = kj ,∀(i, j) ∈ n, (i, j) 6= (1, 2).
The impact of a merger on collusion is captured in our framework by
comparative statics analysis on each border line of the Figure 1. In this
section, we present the method and the results for the border line αCR. In
the next section, the two other border lines are studied.
To obtain comparative statics results on αCR, we compute the value of
φ = αbmCR − αamCR, where the superscripts bm and am denote the threshold
value αCR before and respectively after the merger. If φ is strictly positive,
then the border line αCR in the Figure 1 moves down and so, there exist some
values of α and s for which firms collude and reveal before merger whereas
they do not collude if the merger is accepted by the antitrust authority. In
other words, a merger attenuates the scope of collusion.
To simplify the calculation, we assume that c = 0.
Individual profit functions of the firms (∀i = 1...n) are given by :
piM= 16ki
piD=
ki(−2−ki)2
18(1+2ki)
piN=
βi(2ki−βi)
2ki(1+β)2
with βi = kiki+1 and β =
∑n
i=1 βi.
Proof. See appendix B.
As regards collusion profit, we study perfect collusion in the sense that all
firms make a collusive agreement and we suppose that monopoly aggregate
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output is simply divided in proportion to capital endowments. This is a
key element in the model. Concerning deviation profit, we suppose that
deviation takes the form which is conventionally assumed in this type of
models: the deviant takes the allocated cartel outputs of all other firms as
given and selects the output which maximizes its own profits.
The previous expressions of profits are calculated assuming that n firms
are active (no merger situation). We do the same for the other case, where
n−1 firms stay active. In this case, the production capacity of merged entity
is equal to: km = k1 + k2 = 2k1.
1. The case of ex ante symmetric firms
We suppose that : ki = kj ,∀i 6= j, ∀(i, j) ∈ [1, n]. We have to compute the
value of αCR before merger (which is the same for insider or outsider because
we consider ex ante symmetric firms).
We consider an effective leniency program and a high reduction of fine in
case of revelation of information. The reduced fine must satisfy the following
inequality:
f < δ(piD − piN )
We choose to apply the total immunity for firms which reveal the infor-
mation to the antitrust authority (f = 0), because it is optimal from the
authority point of view8.
We compute the difference: αbmCR−αamCR for the insiders and the outsiders
and we obtain:
lemma 2.
• For the insiders: αbmCR < αamCR, ∀n
8See Motta and Polo (2003).
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• For the outsiders: αbmCR > αamCR, ∀n
Proof. See appendix C.
After merger, the border line αCR moves up for the insiders and moves
down for the outsider firms.
The most restricting border line αCR is the one which is, graphically, the
lowest down (because we consider perfect collusion in the industry, if only
one firm has no incentive to make a collusive agreement, the NC equilibrium
takes place). It is given by:
min
i=ins,out
αiCR
where i designs insiders or outsiders.
We obtain the following proposition:
proposition 1. If each firm has initially the same production capacity, then
a merger will increase (resp. decrease) the space of parameters under which
firms tend to collude for the insiders (resp. the outsiders). The merger will
then reduce the space of parameters under which firms tend to make perfect
collusion in the industry.
The following graphic summarizes the previous results:
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Figure 2: The impact of a merger on αCR in the symmetric case.
Post-merger firms are asymmetric, this decreases the possibility to make
collusive agreements because outsiders have incentives to deviate from the
collusive agreement. In fact, outsiders have smaller production capacity than
merged entity, which creates relative inefficiency. Recall that the collusive
profit is computed with a key element of the model which is that monopoly
aggregate output is divided in proportion to capital endowments, and so
asymmetry causes incentives to deviate form this collusive agreement. This
result reinforces the results obtained by Cabral (2000), Rothschild (1999) or
Penard (1997) who show that it is easier for firms to make collusive agree-
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ments when they are symmetric.
2. The case of ex ante asymmetric firms
In this section, we suppose that, initially, the insiders have the same produc-
tion capacity (k1 = k2), the outsiders have another same production capacity
too (ki = kj ,∀(i, j) 6= (1, 2)), which is different from the production capacity
of the insiders (ki 6= k1,∀i 6= (1, 2)).
We design by ∆ the parameter measuring the ex ante relative asymme-
try of firms. More precisely, we suppose that the production capacity of a
merging firm is:
k1 = k2 =
1 +∆
n
The production capacity of an outsider is then9:
kj =
1−
(
2∆
n−2
)
n
,∀j 6= (1, 2)
We have to analyse two cases. Whether we consider an ex ante relative
efficiency of insiders: ∆ > 0, or an ex ante relative efficiency of outsiders:
∆ < 0.
For the first case:
∆ ∈]0, n
2
− 1[
For the second case:
∆ ∈]− 1, 0[
Proof. See appendix D.
9The total production capacity in the industry is equal to 1, so : 2k1 + (n− 2)kj = 1,
∀j 6= (1, 2). Then we check that : 2 ( 1+∆
n
)
+ (n− 2)
(
1−( 2∆n−2 )
n
)
= 1.
14
We compute the value of φ (αbmCR − αamCR)for each category of firms and
we obtain the following lemma:
lemma 3.
• For the insiders : αbmCR < αamCR,∀n,∀∆ ∈]− 1, n2 − 1[
• For the outsiders : αbmCR > αamCR,∀n,∀∆ ∈]− 1, n2 − 1[
Proof. See appendix E.
Whatever the sign of ∆ is, a merger between firms 1 and 2 will reduce at
one and the same time the space of no collusion for insiders and the space of
collusion for outsiders. We have to determine the total effect of the merger.
Firstly, we compare the border line αCR before merger for each category
of firms. We design by αCR(Out) the border line for outsider firms, and by
αCR(Ins) the border line for insiders. Lemma 4 follows:
lemma 4.
αbmCR(Out) ≤ αbmCR(Ins)⇔ ∆ ≥ 0
To prove this, we do exactly the same than for the lemma 3.
When there is a relative efficiency which favours insiders (∆ > 0), we
obtain the following result:
αamCR(Ins) > α
bm
CR(Ins) > α
bm
CR(Out) > α
am
CR(Out)
When the asymmetry favours insiders, outsiders have higher incentives to
deviate from a collusive agreement because the merger reinforces the relative
inefficiency. For the insiders, the merger reinforces their relative efficiency
and increases the space of parameters under which firms tend to collude.
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We then obtain the following result:
min
i=ins,out
αamCR < min
i=ins,out
αbmCR
Consequently, the merger reduces the space of collusion and revelation for
firms because outsiders have incentives to deviate from the collusive agree-
ment. Proposition 2 follows:
proposition 2. When the ex ante asymmetry favours insiders, then the
space of parameters under which firms make a collusive agreement is reduced
after the merger.
The following graphic summarizes our results when we consider an ex ante
asymmetry favouring insiders (we represent only the area which is interesting
for us, which is the North-East of the Figure 1).
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Figure 3: The impact of a merger on αCR in the case: ∆ > 0.
We now look into the case in which there is an ex ante relative inefficiency
of insiders (∆ < 0). We know that the space of collusion under outsiders
tend to collude decreases after the merger, whereas it increases for insiders10.
Moreover, before merger, αCR for outsiders is above αCR for insiders11. In
order to evaluate the global impact of the merger, we have to compare αCR
for insiders before merger with αCR for outsiders after merger. We obtain
the following lemma.
lemma 5. αbmCR(Ins) > α
am
CR(Out) for ∆ > ∆˜(n).
10See lemma 3.
11See lemma 4.
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Proof. Values of ∆˜(n) are reported in the appendix F.
We then obtain the following results:
• if ∆ > ∆˜(n) : {αamCR(Ins), αbmCR(Out)} > αbmCR(Ins) > αamCR(Out)
• if ∆ < ∆˜(n) : αbmCR(Out) > αamCR(Out) > αbmCR(Ins)
The comparison of αamCR(Ins) and α
bm
CR(Out) is not useful, only the border
lines which are the lowest down are restricting. If we take into account all
the firms in the industry, then, for the case ∆ > ∆˜(n), the merger will
reduce the possibility of collusion ex post. But if there is a high degree of
asymmetry between firms (∆ < ∆˜(n)), the space of parameters under which
firms tend to collude increases after the merger takes place. The following
graphic summarizes the results:
Figure 4: The impact of a merger on αCR in the case: ∆ < 0
We then obtain the following proposition:
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proposition 3. Given ∆˜(n) (∆˜(n) < 0) such as : αbmCR(Ins) = α
am
CR(Out).
For ∆ < ∆˜(n), the merger increases the space of parameters under which
firms collude. For ∆ > ∆˜(n), the merger reduces the space of parameters
under which firms collude.
The main originality of the paper is that we can compute the exact value
of asymmetry ex ante in order for the merger to have pro-competitive effects,
taking into account the possibility for firms to denounce the cartel agreement
(apply for leniency).
The variable ∆˜(n), which satisfies the equality: αbmCR(Ins) = α
am
CR(Out),
is not the parameter which establishes a perfect symmetry of firms ex post.
As a matter of fact, the parameter which establishes an ex post perfect
symmetry of firms is given by:
∆¯(n) = − (n− 2)
2(n− 1) (1)
Proof. See the appendix G.
Moreover, we prove that: ∆¯(n) < ∆˜(n)
Proof. See the appendix H.
The following graphic summarizes the effect of a merger, depending of
the degree of asymmetry between firms.
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Figure 5: Summary diagram
Below ∆˜(n), a merger increases the possibilities for firms to collude
whereas above, the merger has pro-competitive effects. Moreover, the param-
eter which establishes a perfect symmetry of firms ex post (∆¯(n)) is always
smaller than ∆˜(n). This finds the usual results of the literature about the
impact of mergers on collusion, and we reinforce them by computing the
value of ex ante asymmetry necessary to decrease the space of parameters
under which firms tend to collude ex post.
V. Comparative statics analysis on the other border
lines
1. NC versus CNR
In this section, we make comparative statics on the border line αNC before
and after merger. The parameters δ and s are assumed to be constant
(they do not have any impact of the moving of the border line αNC) and
consequently, the only difference considering the sign of αbmCR − αamCR and
αbmNC −αamNC is that in one case we consider reduced fine (f is assumed to be
equal to 0), whereas in the other case, we consider the full fine F .
The previous propositions 1 and 2 remain valid considering αNC .
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For the proposition 3, the only difference is the value of the threshold
∆(n) for which the merger has procompetitive effects. We obtain the follow-
ing proposition.
proposition 4. Given ∆ˆ (∆ˆ < 0) such as : αbmNC(Ins) = α
am
NC(Out). For
∆ < ∆ˆ, the merger increases the space of parameters under which firms
collude without revelation. For ∆ > ∆ˆ, the merger reduces the space of
parameters under which firms collude without revelation.
Proof. The values of ∆ˆ(n) are reported in the appendix I.
These results reinforce our previous results obtained for the border line
αCR.
2. CR versus CNR
Comparative statics results on sCNR allow to know the impact of a merger
on the effectiveness of leniency.
Firstly, we suppose that firms are ex ante symmetric. Then we obtain
the following proposition :
proposition 5. If each firm has initially the same production capacity, then
a merger will increase (resp. decrease) the space of parameters under which
firms tend to collude without revelation for the insiders (resp. the outsiders).
The merger will then reduce the space of parameters under which firms tend
to collude without revelation in the industry.
Proof. See Appendix J.
If we consider ex ante asymmetric firms, we prove that, as previously,
there exists a threshold under which a merger has procollusive effects in
21
the sense that under collusion, a merger decreases the incentives for firms to
reveal the information to the antitrust authority and so to apply for leniency.
We then obtain the following proposition :
proposition 6. Given ∆ˇ (∆ˇ < 0) such as : sbmCNR(Ins) = s
am
CNR(Out). For
∆ < ∆ˇ, the merger reduces the incentives for colluding firms to apply for
leniency. For ∆ > ∆ˇ, the merger increases the incentives for colluding firms
to apply for leniency.
Proof. The values of ∆ˇ(n) are reported in the appendix K.
VI. Concluding remarks
This paper deals with the impact of a merger on the possibility for firms
to collude. The major contribution of this article is to consider an ex ante
merger control associated with an ex post detection of explicit collusion,
allowing for leniency. Our results confirm the results obtained by several
authors dealing with this subject (Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002), Vascon-
celos (2005), ...) and we reinforce these by computing the optimal thresh-
old of asymmetry among insiders and outsiders such as a merger has pro-
competitive effects.
Of course, antitrust authority does not evaluate only pro-collusive effect
but also the possibility of abuse of dominant position and then faces a trade-
off between decreasing the risk of pro-collusive effects (when two efficient
firms merge for example) and increasing the market power of merged entity.
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VI. Appendix
Appendix A : Justification of n > 3
For n ≤ 2, then a merger reduces the competition to only one firm, which is
not an interesting case to study.
For n = 3, we can easily prove that, in the case of symmetric firms before
merger (ki = 1/3), then the post-merger profit of an outsider is less in the
case of collusive equilibrium than in a case of Nash equilibrium12. Also, the
discount factor under which collusion is sustainable for the outsider is higher
than 1, there is never collusion after merger, which is not an interesting case
to study also.
Appendix B : Profit functions
• Nash profit.
The individual maximization program when firms play non coopera-
tively is:
Maxqi(1− (
∑n
i=1 qi))qi − q
2
i
2ki
Then, equilibrium values are :
Q = β(1+β)
p = 11+β
qi = βi1+β
with βi = kiki+1 and β =
∑n
i=1(βi) (Cf McAfee and Williams, 1992).
• Collusion profit.
12Profit functions are reported in Appendix B
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As Vasconcelos (2005), we suppose that the collusive outcomes are
based on an allocation of the monopoly output proportional to the
individual capital stocks. This is the profit maximizing allocation of a
monopolist with decreasing returns.
The maximization program when firms play cooperatively is:
MaxQM (1−QM )QM − (Q
M )2
2
∑
ki
with
∑n
i=1 ki = 1
We obtain:
QM = 13 and
qM = ki ∗ 13 and we replace QM and qM in the profit function to obtain
the equilibrium collusion profit.
• Deviation profit.
As in Rothschild (1999), we suppose here that deviation takes the form
which is conventionally assumed in models of this type : the deviant
takes the allocated cartel outputs of all other firms as given and selects
the output which maximizes its own profits.
The maximization program for a firm which deviates from the collusive
agreement is:
Maxqi(1− qi − (1− ki)(13)) ∗ qi −
q2i
2ki
qDi =
1−(1−ki)( 13 )
2+k−1i
and we replace in the profit function to obtain the
deviation profit.
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Appendix C : Proof of lemma 2
In order to compute the value of φ, we have to compute the values of αCR
before and after the merger.
αCR =
piM − (1− δ)piD − δpiN
(piM − piN )
Profits functions13 for the insiders before and after merger (with ki = 1n) are
given by:
piM =
1
6
ki
⇒ pibmM =
1
6n
, piamM =
1
6n
piD =
ki(−2− ki)2
18(1 + 2ki)
⇒ pibmD =
(2n+ 1)2
18n2(n+ 2)
, piamD =
2(n+ 1)2
9n2(n+ 4)
β =
n∑
i=1
(βi) =
n∑
i=1
(
bki
bki + 1
)
⇒ βbm = 2ki
ki + 1
+
(n− 2)(1− 2ki)
1− 2ki + n− 2 =
n
1 + n
βam =
2ki
2ki + 1
+
(n− 2)(1− 2ki)
1− 2ki + n− 2 = 1−
3
n+ 1
+
2
n+ 2
piN =
βi(2ki − βi)
2ki(1 + β)2
⇒ pibmN =
n+ 2
2(2n+ 1)2
, piamN =
(n+ 1)2(4 + n)
2n2(5 + 2n)2
13We compute the individual profit function after merger.
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We then replace these expressions in αbmCR and α
am
CR in order to compute the
value of: αbmCR − αamCR for the insiders. We obtain:
φIns =
2 (12 + n (109 + 8n (17 + n (7 + n)))) (−1 + δ)
3n (2 + n) (4 + n) (6 + n (4 + n))
It is straightforward to prove that φIns < 0.
Now we have to compute the value of φ for the outsiders.
Premerger profit are the same for insiders and outsiders because firms
are perfectly symmetric. Post-merger profits are given by:
piamM =
1
6n
, piamD =
2(n+ 1)2
9n2(n+ 4)
, βam = 1− 3
n+ 1
+
2
n+ 2
, piamN =
(n+ 2)3
2n2(5 + 2n)2
We infer that:
φOut =
−4 (1 + n (5 + 2n)) (−1 + δ)
n (3 + n) (−8 + (−1 + n) n)
φOut is strictly positive (by assumptions n > 3).
Appendix D : Domain of definition of ∆
When we consider a relative efficiency of insiders (∆ > 0), the sum of pro-
duction capacities of insiders can not exceed 1, then:
2
(
1 + ∆
n
)
< 1
and ∆ < n2 − 1.
For the opposite case (∆ < 0), the production capacity of a merged firm
must be greater than 0, then:
1 + ∆
n
> 0
and ∆ > −1.
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Appendix E : Proof of lemma 3
After simplifications, we obtain :
αbmCR(Ins) =
3
n
+ (−1+δ) (1+2n+∆)
2
n2 (2+n+2∆)
− 9 δ (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n
2+2∆)2
(−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
3
(
1
n
− 3 (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n2+2∆)
2
(−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
αamCR(Ins) =
3n+ 4 (−1+δ) (1+n+∆)
2
4+n+4∆
− 9 δ (2+n−n
2+2∆)2 (4+n+4∆)
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
3
(
n− 3 (2+n−n2+2∆)
2
(4+n+4∆)
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
We compute the value of αbmCR(Ins) − αamCR(Ins). To sign this difference
depending on n, δ and ∆, we plot (in three dimensions) this function varying
n and we obtain that this difference is always negative ∀n > 3,∀∆ ∈]−1, n2 −
1[.
For the outsiders, we obtain:
αbmCR(Out) =
3 (1− 2∆−2+n )
n
+
(−1+δ) (2+3n−2n2+2∆)2 (n−2 (1+∆))
(−2+n)2 n2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) −
9 δ (1+n+∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(2n3−2 (1+∆)2+n2 (−1+2∆)−n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
3
(
1− 2∆−2+n
n
− 3 (1+n+∆)
2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(2n3−2 (1+∆)2+n2 (−1+2∆)−n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
αamCR(Out) =
3n
(
1− 2∆−2+n
)
+
(−1+δ) (2+3n−2n2+2∆)2 (n−2 (1+∆))
(−2+n)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) −
9 δ (2+n+2∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
3
(
n− 2n∆−2+n −
3 (2+n+2∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
We prove that: αbmCR − αamCR > 0,∀n > 3,∀∆ ∈]− 1, n2 − 1[.
Appendix F : Proof of lemma 5
We obtain that αbmCR(Ins)− αamCR(Out) > 0 for ∆ > ∆˜(n).
αbmCR(Ins)− αamCR(Out) =
3
n
+ (−1+δ) (1+2n+∆)
2
n2 (2+n+2∆)
− 9 δ (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n
2+2∆)2
(−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
3
(
1
n
− 3 (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n2+2∆)
2
(−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
) −
−
(
3n
(
1− 2∆−2+n
)
+
(−1+δ) (2+3n−2n2+2∆)2 (n−2 (1+∆))
(−2+n)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) −
9 δ (2+n+2∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
3
(
n− 2n∆−2+n −
3 (2+n+2∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
27
The derivative of this expression function of δ does not depend of δ and so
we can fix δ = 0.9 for example because δ does not affect the values of ∆˜(n).
The values of ∆˜(n) are given by resolving: α
bm
CR(Ins)
αamCR(Out)
= 1.
We then obtain:
n ∆˜(n)
4 -0.180177
5 -0.163638
6 -0.148173
7 -0.134942
8 -0.123741
9 -0.114209
10 -0.106025
· · · · · ·
Table 1: Values of ∆˜(n).
Appendix G : Values of ∆¯(n)
In order to establish perfect symmetry ex post, ∆¯(n)must satisfy: 2
(
1+∆¯(n)
n
)
=
1−
(
2∆¯(n)
n−2
)
n .
Appendix H : Proof of: ∆¯(n) < ∆˜(n)
We compute the value of ∆¯(n) for each value of n:
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n ∆¯(n)
4 − 1
3
5 − 3
8
6 − 2
5
7 − 5
12
8 − 3
7
9 − 7
16
10 − 4
9
Table 2: Values of ∆¯(n).
By making a comparison between the two previous tables, we infer that :
∆¯(n) < ∆˜(n),∀n
Appendix I : values of ∆ˆ(n).
The only difference computing the values of ∆ˆ(n) or ∆˜(n) is that in only
one case, we consider the amount of the fine. By numerical simulations we
can prove that ∆ˆ(n) is a increasing function of the full fine F . The following
table gives the values of ∆ˆ(n) for F = 0.01.
n ∆ˆ(n)
4 -0.179602
5 -0.145101
6 -0.116431
7 -0.0944429
8 -0.0776809
9 -0.064774
10 -0.0546968
· · · · · ·
Table 3: Values of ∆ˆ(n).
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Appendix J : Proof of proposition 5
For the insiders :
sbmCNR =
(−1+n)2
1+n (−2+n+6F (1+2n)2)
samCNR =
(−2+n) (6+n (4+n))
−12+n (−2+n (2+n+6F (5+2n)2))
Consequently,
sbmCNR−samCNR =
−18F n (−4 + n (−25 + 4 (−2 + n) n))(
1 + n
(
−2 + n+ 6F (1 + 2n)2
)) (
−12 + n
(
−2 + n
(
2 + n+ 6F (5 + 2n)2
)))
It is straightforward to prove that this expression is strictly negative.
For the outsiders :
sbmCNR is the same than for insiders.
samCNR =
(3+n) (−8+(−1+n)n)
−24+n (−11+n (2+n+6F (5+2n)2))
Consequently,
sbmCNR−samCNR =
72F n (2 + n) (1 + n (5 + 2n))(
1 + n
(
−2 + n+ 6F (1 + 2n)2
)) (
−24 + n
(
−11 + n
(
2 + n+ 6F (5 + 2n)2
)))
It is sraightforward to prove that this expression is strictly positive.
Appendix K : Values of ∆ˇ(n).
We obtain that sbmCNR(Ins)− samCNR(Out) > 0 for ∆ > ∆ˇ(n).
sbmCNR(Ins)− samCNR(Out) =
(1 + ∆)
(
1
n
− 3 (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n
2+2∆)2
(−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
6
(
F + 1+∆
6n
− (1+∆) (2+n+2∆) (2+n−n2+2∆)
2
2 (−2n3+n2 (1−2∆)+2 (1+∆)2+n (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)−
n− 2n∆−2+n −
3 (2+n+2∆)2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
(n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
6n2
(
F +
1− 2∆−2+n
6n
− (2+n+2∆)
2 (n2−4 (1+∆)) (n−2 (1+∆))
2n2 (n+2n2+4n∆−2 (1+∆) (5+2∆))2
)
The values of ∆ˇ(n) are given by resolving: sbmCNR(Ins)− samCNR(Out) = 0 for
each value of n. After having set values for n, we can prove that F has no
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impact of the value of ∆ˇ(n), and we obtain the following table (for every
value of F > 0) :
n ∆ˇ(n)
4 -0.179445
5 -0.1412
6 -0.110969
7 -0.0885561
8 -0.0718996
9 -0.0593288
10 -0.049672
· · · · · ·
Table 4: Values of ∆ˇ(n).
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